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The starting point of this paper is a beiief that 
development planning in practice has achieved few of the 
benefits that its advocates expected from it. Most reasons 
given for this poor performance do not get te the source of 
the problem, which is the naivety of the implicit model of 
governmental decision-making incorporatea in the planning 
literature. More realistic views of politics and decisión-
making, familiar in other social sciences and even other 
branches of economics but largely ignored in development 
economics, pose the questions whether planning, as it has 
come to be understood, is feasible at ali, ana, even if 
feasible, whether it could be an efficient instrument of 
economic policy. Suggestions are made on what could be 
rescuea from the debris. 
The nature of development planning 
Although planning occurs in raany types of decision-
making units and is often defined to cc-ver any attempt 
to select the best means to achieve desired ends,"5" 
this paper focuses more narrowly on 'comprehensive 
development planning.' The chief concern, then, is 
with planning as practiced in low-income countries 
(although the discussion is also relevant to the 'special 
case' of industrial countries)., which typically has the 
following characteristics;^ 
(a) Starting from the political views and goals of 
the government, it attempts to define policy 
objectives, especially as they relate the future 
development of the economy? 
(b) It sets out a strategy by means of which it is intended 
to achieve the objectives, which are normally translated 
into specific targets; 
(c) It presents a centrally co-ordinated., internally 
consistent set of principies and policies, chosen as 
the optimal means of implementing the strategy and 
achieving the targets, and intended to be used as a 
framework to guide subsequent day-to-day decisions; 
(d) It comprehends the whole economy (henee it is 
'comprehensive3 as against 'colonial' or public sector1 
planning) 
(e) In order to secure optimality and consistency, 
it employs a more-or-less formalised macro-economic 
model (which, however, will often remain unpublished) , 
and this is employed to project the intended future 
performance of the economy; 
(f) It typically covers a period of, say, five years 
ana finds physical expression as a medium-term plan 
document, which may¡ however, incorpórate a longer-
term perspective plan and be supplemented by annual 
plans. 
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Most of the riñe, rr.ost governments of low-income countries 
employ developir.ent planning of the type outlined; we are 
thus examining a highly significant aspect of applied ~ 
economics and the characteristics listed are chosen to 
identify what is comiúon to comprehensive development 
planning rather than to draw attention to anv special 
features or eccentricities. 
The economic case for development planning, while 
3 sometimes taken as axiomatic, is generallv made out in 
4 
terms of the failings of an unregulated market economy. 
Perhaps the chief of the arguments views planning as a 
superior means of arriving at investment and other decisions 
affecting the future, with the market seen as supplying 
information which is a poor guide for such decisions, 
leading to avoidable uncertainties and myopia."^. Thus, 
Scitovsky and others drew attention to the interdependence 
of investment decisions and allegea that aggregate invest-
ment made up of atomistic decisions would be less than 
that which would result from "centralised investment 
planning" providing more realistic signáis of present plans 
and future conditions,^ In other ways, too, planning is seen 
as a means for correcting discrepancies between private 
and social valuations, for example.the market:s tendency 
to over-value unskilled labour. Under the infiuence . 
of the 'big push' school of thought, planning was also 
seen as the cnly way to mobilise resources on the scale 
necessary for a successful development effort, and as the 
only practical means of binding the various strands of 7 economxc pclicy into a consistent whole. 
.1 • • -The crisis in planning; explanations? solutions 
There would probably be littie disagreement today 
that the practice of planning has failed to bring many of 
the benefits expected from it. Waterston's stuay of the 
lessons of experience concluded that "there heve been many 
more failures than successes in the implementation of 
development plans"b; Seer1s key-ncte paper for a 1969 
conference on 'The Crisis in Planning' was entitled 
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'The Prevalence of Pseudo-planning'9; and Healey is surely 
accurate in claiming that the results "have been sadly 
disillusioning for those who believed that planning was the 
•, .i 10 only way. 
The disillusionment seerns to apply in most parts of the 
third world. Myrdal's 1968 Asian study stated that "planning 
can be considered a going concern only in India and . 
11 
Pakistan.. . "J" and events since then have been the disinte-
gration of Pakistan as it then was and the publication in 12 
India of a new pian widelvthought to be quite unrealistic. 
The Organisation of American States has reported that it was 
"repeatedly discovered that long-term plans were either not 
put into effect, or they were implemented officially for only 
a fraction of their time, or they were simply ignored at the 13 
moment of govemmental decisions.'* " In similar vein, the 
ü.N. Economic Commission for Africa has stated that develop-
ment plans "had little, if any, impact on the overall develop-
ment of [West African]countries, and can at best be taken 
as an expression of the desires of governments or the hopes Ia-of small groups of experts." * Helleiner has written of a i 5 
disillusionment in Africa with the potentialities of planning, 
and I know of no African state which is currently engaged in 
a serious planning effort, in the sense of using its plan 
as guide to day-to-day policy decisions and the preparation 
16 of its budgets. 
None of this, of course, is to aeny some genuine 
benefits. The creation of planning agencies and^ preparation 
of plan documents has surely had an educational effect among 
politicians and administrators, helping to define, and raise 
the understanding of, major policy issues. Planners do not 
spend all their time dressing windows and have certainly helped 
to raise the standard of policy decisions on matters such 
as project selection. Nevertheless, there has been a nearly 
perfect vacuum between the theoretical benefits and practical 
results of development planning. It is doubtful whether 
plans have generated more useful signáis for the future than 
i "7 
would otherwise have been fortncoming;± governments have 
rarely, in practice, reconoiled private and social valuations 
except in a piecemeal manner; because they have seldom been 
operational documents, plans have probably had only limited 16 
impact in mobiiising resources " and in co-ordinating economic 
policies. 
The profession cannot be criticised for being unresponsive 
on this situation. Much thought has been given to the sources 
of poor plan performance, with the following among the most 
commonly mentioned causes:^ 
(a) Deficiencies in the plans; they tend to be over-ambitious, 
to be based upon inappropriately specified macro-models 
to be insufficiently specific about policies and projects, 
to overlook important non-economic considerations, to 
: ... fail to incorpórate adecúate administrative provision 
for their own implementation. 
(b) Insufficient and unreliable data; inadequate supplies 
cf economists and other planning personnel. 
(c) Unanticipated dislocations to domestic economic activity, 
often due to external factors, such as adverse 
movements in the terms of trade or irregular flows 
of development aid. : ¡v 
(a) Various institutional weaknesses: failures to lócate 
the planning agency appropriately in the iaachinery of 
government; failure of communication between planners, 
administrators, and their political masters; the 
importation of institutional arrangements unsuited to 
local circumstances. 
(e) Various failings on the part of the administrative 
civil services cumbersome bureaucratic procedures; 
excessive caution and resistance to innovations; 
personal and departmental rivalries; lack of concern 
with economic considerations (Finance Ministries are 
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a particularly frequent target, often said to undermine 
the planning agency by resisting the co-ordination of 
plans and budgets). 
There is certainly ampie evidence that each of these 
tendencies has contributea to the planning crisis, the 
precise combination varying over time and from country 
to country. But there seerns to be a growing consensus 
among economists that ye.t another set of factors is the most 
important explanation: that "lack of government support for 
the plans is the prime reason vhy most are never carried out 
20 successfully y" Seers, while also finding fault with 
administrators and economists, argües that "political forces 11 
encourage the production of pseudo-plans;Tinbergen sees 
as one of the difficulties "that among politicians, probably 
as a consequence of our educational system, a preference 
22 exists for thinking in qualitative térras only;" ~ and Myrdal 
refers to "rivalries between parties or ministers" as one 
2 3 of the major problems.' 
In the face, presumabiy, of the futility of advocating 
reformea political systems, most proposals intended to improve 
planning performance tend to be administrative or organisat-
ional. Myrdal-perhaps come closest to advocating a political 
solution in arguing for "democratic", or decentralisea, 
24 / planning. " Helleiner also tries to grasp the political 
nettle, with the prescription that "those engaged in planning 
.activities must be sufficiently cióse to the seat of political 
power to be relevant to the actual process of political deci-
sión making..." but sees the prac^ical application of this 
25 
largely in terms of "new institutions and personnel". 
Consistent with his views on the baneful influence of 
traditional education, a U.N. committee headed by Tinbergen 2 6 
advocates "Intensified training of many persons involved;" 
and Waterston's proposal for an :toperational approacn"1 to 
planning emphasises the use of annual plans tied into budgetary 
proceaures~.^nd supplemented by ; multi-annual sector 
27 programmes.11 
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But despite economists1 attempts to respond to the 
crisis, the lar ge questions Which have gone unasked suggest 
that the diagnoses¿and prescriptic-ns just summarised have not 
been radical enough. If we think of planning as a way of 
raising the standard of government policies, how is it that 
politicians are generally seen as spoiiers, for would it 
not be in their own Ínterests to give development planning 
2 8 
their full support? ü Or might it be that the concept of 
development planning is one that could not, with the best 
will in the world, be built into the process of government 
because 'politics isn't like that'? Might it even be that 
a government really committed to the full execution of a 
plan could end up making worse decisions rather than better? 
It might similarly be asked of those advocating 
administrative-type reforms to raise plan effectiveness, what 
makes them think these solutions to be feasible of atta.inment 
through precisely those political processes which are blamed 
for past failings? Are not deficient institutions and proce-
dures an expression of the political system itself, not to be 
remedied without first or simultaneously instituting political 
changes? For example, the respective roles of the planning 
agency and the finance ministry reflect, in substantial part, 
a distribution of political power; is it useful, then, to 
make proposals for raising the relative influence of the 
planning agency while remaining silent on the distribution 
of power? 
Economists have generally failed to ask such questions 
and, significantly, it was a political scientist who, on 
reviewing explanations for plan failures similar to the list 
given above, was led to observe that it rather plainly 
add up to the conclusión that planning is more or less bound 
to fail, given the probability that many of these factors 
will be present in any situation of underdevelopment," and 
to urge that "Any useful conceptualisation of the planning 
29 
process must start from a model of politics.' The record 
of past performance certainly does not suggest that we can 
ignore the possibility that effective planning may not be 
feasible, so the next step is to take up Leys' point and 
examine the model of politics upon which the notion of 
development planning appears to have been built. 
A planner's model of politics 
This task, however, is one of combing the literature 
for hints and inferences, because the main characteristic 
of writings on development planning is the virtual absence 
of systematic discussion of the implications of planning 
for political systems, or vice versa, even though authors often 
insist that a plan is essentially a political document. 
Writers such as Lewis do have pithy things to say about 
politics but only at the level of shrewd common sense. 
Virtually no attempt is maae to use the analytical tools of 
the political scientist. Economists seam te find it more 
comfortable to gat rid of this problen by treating politics 
as creating "boundary conditions" constraining the variation 
31 
of targets and policy Instruments. The result is a largely 
unarticulatea view of political processes, which appears to 
owe the greatest intellectual debt nct to the study of govern-
ment but to economists' ovn theories of the behaviour of 32 individuáis and firms. 
The starting point is an implicit assumption that 
governments normally seek to act in the national interest. 
This follows from a theory which establishes the case for 
planning largely to correct for the social defeets of the 
market mechanism. The problem of social choice, as Arrow has 
pointed out, is that it needs public officials whose "one 
aim in life is to implement the valúes of other citizens 
3 3 
as given by some rule of collective decision-making." 
If ministers individually and collectively pursue personal 
or sectional, rather than national, interests they will 
merely be replacing the private valuations of the market by 
their own imposed private valuations, for we surely would 
not want to define as social any government valuation. So 
if plans are to reconcile private and social interests and 
if the objectives they incorpórate are to provide a plausible 
proxy for a social welfare function then these objectives 
"must always have been considered as some versión of 'the 
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general interest.1"J" 
The analogy with a social welfare function draws 
attention to further assurnptions we must make about 
governments and the raen that forra them. It is a. standard 
formulation that a government must hand to its planners a set 
of objectives between which it will have priorities in 
35 
situations of goal conflicts and trade-offs. Note the 
implicationss that governments ccilectively are clear about 
their economic objectives and are willing to have these art-
iculated in a public document. We might also note that, 
while usually taking a properly positivist view that the 
formulation of objectives is a task for governments not 
planners, the idea of development planning rests upon the 
unstated presumption that 'development' will rank very high 
among the goals of economic policy. If development were to 
be subordinated to, say, price stability or the short-run 
maximisation of consumption there may remain a case for some 
sort of planning but not planning which takes development, 
as the first-order goal. 
It follows from what has already been said that economists, 
if not explicitly, see ministers as role-oriented, as looking 
for the solution of problems through acts of policy. One 
of the merits often claimed for planning is that it enables 
problems to be anticipated and defined, and assists the og 
selection of the most appropriate policy solutions. So a 
rather high-minded view is taken; of politicians in power 
because of the good they can do, unafraid of problems, 
anxious to use their time and power3 to solve them. The 
view is also taken that circumstances will be such that the 
government will be willing and abie to undertake the large 
'bunching® of decisions that is implicit. in the. conscientious 
adoption of a meaium-term plan. 
The influence of our modeis of economic man and the 
profit-maximising firm are fairly evident in cur (usually 
tacit) assumption of governments as optimisers, seeking the 
best possible policy response to a given set of problems, 
wishing always to be consistent (if A is preferred to B and B 
is preferred to C then ...) , at least in the médium term. 
This is indicated by the heavy emphasis in the literature on 
macro-modelling, input-output, mathematical programming, and 
37 
other optimxsing techniques. Even more tacit, perhaps, is 
a belief that the politicians will see problems essentially 
as economists see them (if a problem were perceivea in some 
radically different way there is ciearly little likelihood 
that the policy response recommended by the economist would 
meet the needs of the politician), of which an assumption 
that politicians" time-horizons are distant enough for 
perspective and medium-term planning to be appropriate is a 
case in point. Another influence here is Tinbergen's work 
on the theory of economic policy? his sharp distinction bet~ 
ween policy objectives and instruments is generally carried 
into the planning literature, with its implication that choices 
between alternative policy weapons are relatively value-neutral. 
Economists' expectations that a government will have a 
ciearly defined set of policy objectives in the medium-term 
also suggests the inference that governments will maintain 
a relatively high degree of internal unity. Wit'nout it there 
would be little chance of formulating a consistent, relatively 
settled and operational set of objectives, or of imposing 
the discipline of the plan on subsequent decisions. J.n the 
absence of harmony the prime task of political leadership 
would be to maintain an essential minimum of unity by conti-
nuous compromises, playing one group off against another, 
fudying contentious issues, re-shuffling the cabinet, and so 
on. The dynamics of such a situation would reduce the 
utility of medium-term planning; political time-horizons 
would not be long enough. It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
lack of government agreement on objectives and lack of unity 
3 8 within cabinets are among the reasons given for plan failures. 
This line of reasoning can be taken a little further 
to point out the obvious, but generally unstated, fact that 
the notion of medium-term planning presupposes the absence 
of chronic political instability or, at least, a clear 
national consensus on what the objectives of economic policy 
ought to be, so that governments may diffar in personnel but 
not in intent. If these conaitions are not satisfied a 
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political document like a plan will survive only as long 
as the regime that spawned it. While essential to medium-
term planning, the assumption of political stability or 
consensus is a strong one, rarely articulated in the 
literature. 
The literature also has implications for the locus of 
power in society. The emphasis on the use of plans to produce 
a co-ordinated system of economic policies implies a relatively 
high degree of centralisation. If planning functions are de-
legated over a number of separate agencies the practical task 
of co-ordination becomes much more difficult, and inconsiste-
ncies and conflicts between these agencies become virtually 
inevitable."* It is true tnat writers on development 
planning have had a good deal to say in favour of regional 
planning but witnout being very clear about how to reconcile 
it with central co-ordination. In practice, as Waterston 
found, "regional planning has proceeded independently of 
national planning, with the result that a series of uninte-
grated regional plans has sometimes been produced, basad on 
40 
regional aspirations rather than available resources.'1 
The underlying philosophy is for central planning, which is 
why Myrdal5 s proposals for "democratic" planning would 
represent a departure from the conventional type. The 
advocacy cf central planning presupposes the existence of 
enough power at the centre te override regional and other sec-
tional interests. 
The same conclusión can be arrived at from another 
direction. If we take government objectives to have been 
considered "as some versión of the general interest" we 
are by the same token assuming adequate powers at the centre 
to ensure that the general interest prevails over special 
interests. Or perhaps we are making the even stronger 
assumption that special interest groups will not pursue their 
cwn objectives when these are shown te be inconsistent with 
the general interest? Thus, Tinbergen advocates "distributive 
41 meetings" between planners and others" 
"where the distribution of something - say, the buil-
dincr velume 
— over 2. number of mterested groups — 
say the Ministries - is discussed and maybe even 
decided upon. This meeting tries to solve a 
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number of equations - e.g. those representing the 
conclition of equal marginal utility of various uses 
made of one product.*.a comparison of the marginal 
Utilities of different groups is involved - the 
central problem the structure of the social welfare 
or utility function..." 
This description is remarkably different from any inter-
Ministrial meetings I have ever attended? note the assumed 
subordination of the particular to the national interest, alio-
wing utilities to be equaüsed at the margin. 
The type of society that appears to be the most amenable 
to development planning, then, is a monistic one, as compared 
with a pluralistic society in which government policies respond 
to ana seek to adjudícate between competing group pressures. 
As Leys puts it, if the central planners were given the powers 
needed to implement the plans, "the problem of political 
42 
pluralism would have virtually desappeared." It is therefore 
no coincidence to find many of the weaknesses of Indian 
planning blamed upon competition between the rival pressure groups 
which are, however, but an expression of that country's 43 parliementary. democracy. 
The implicit assumptioh of monism has another facet, 
in its implication of relatively simple control relationshipa, 
with the centre issuing commands (laws) and the perlphery f 
passively implementingythem. A centralised structure of 
authority would help pían implementation but would contradict 
a view of political l^'eadership which sees a plurality of roles 
and a much more suJ^le interplay of responses between the Íeaders 
and the led. 
This latteá/point and much that precedes it reveáis ^ 
tendency in thé literature to tacitly assume the state to be a 
highly efflcacious agent of change ánd control. In fact, the 
derivation of a theory of planning from an analysis of markét 
y i- • : \ 
defepts and failures rests upon the unstated presumption that 
when.markets fail the state will do better. There is much' talk / V \ \ ' of market failures? little, at least until recently, of goyern>-44 ' \ 
jnent failures. v 
\ : V \ , i / 
'-Some adversarles of planning, of whom this writer is not 
one,.oppose it en the grounes that they distrust the motives 
45 
and efficacy of central governments." But it is not necessa-
ry to take this view in oráer to have serious doubts about 
the presumption of state efficacy, because it is a presumptic-n 
that seems to require some extraordinarily strong assumptions 
about information flows and uncertainties, It requires 
governments and their aaministrators to have a sufficient 
understanding oí" the behaviour of the economy to be able te 
make accurate diagnoses of its weaknesses and to know with 
reasonable accuracy how it will respond to given policy measu-
res. There would seem to be little case for medium-term pía-
..nning except on the grounds that governments are faced with 
manageabie degrees of uncertainty and can be reasonably 
confident of the consequences of their policy actions 
(including the absence of major unwanted second- order effeets). 
Tnis further implies a rather ampie stock and flow of informat-
ion and rather advanced capacity to process and interpret it.^6 
3t takes for granted (by failing to consider the opposite)• 
that the costs of obtaining and processing the information 
would be exceeded by the benefits derived therefrom. 
To sum up, it appears that the planner's model of politics 
wovld have us see governments as composed of public-spirited, 
knwledgeable and role-orientea politicians; clear and united 
in their objectives; choosing those policies which will 
acaieve optimal results for the national interest; willing 
aid able to go beyond a short-term point of view. Governments 
a;e stable in relatively monistic, undifferentiated societies; 
wiilding a centralised concentration of power and a relatively 
un'uestioned authority; generally capable of achieving the 
reults they desire from a given policy decisión. They are 
suported by public administrations with ready access to a very 
lage volume of relevant information which they can process 
wih efficiency. It is not clear how. political scientists 
miht classify such governments. Parliamentary democracy is 
mot probably ruled out; so are the more repressive forms 
of¿ictatorship. 
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This view cf politics raises major doubts about its 
realism and, therefore, its relevance. The next step, 
then, is to contrast the planner's model with the conclusions 
of political scientists, sociologists and others who have 
studied governments and their decisión processes.- It would, 
however, be contradictory to suggest a single behavioural 
model of government to cover the extreme diversity to be 
founa among developing countries. The intention rather 
is to offer a few generalisations which can plausibly be 
regarded as having fairly wiaespread application to these 
countries. 
Behavioural views of politics and decisions 
The first generalisation is that, far from being monistic, 
society is often marked by considerable differentiaticn and 
severe social tensions, caused by differences of religión, 
caste, tribe, language, regional origin, education, and 
47 
rather extreme inequalities of income and wealth. Although 
pressure groups may not yet have achieved a high level of 
organisation, politics «ill, invarying degrees, reflect the 
competing interests within society and the art of government 
becomes essentially one of conflict-management. Due, however, 
to limited institutional and other capacities to resolve these 
conflicts peaceably, there is a more frequent tendency than 
in industrial nations for social conflict to result in 
violence and other extra-legal actions, and thus for greater 
political instability. Politics is likely to be competitiva, 
although the competition often will not occur within a legal; 
framework of electoral choice between opposed political 
48 parties. " The pluralistic nature of society will tend to 
result in a diffusión of power, geographically and among 
A 9 institutions, and the first concern of a government and 
its v"ivil service is likely to be the maintenance of its 
50 authority s 
Non-industrial modemising societies.. . lack the 
powerful integrating thrust found in industrial 
societies. Social organisations are more chaotic and 
confusec. Politics becomes the mechanism of integrátion, 
and authority is the critical problem confronting the 
Íeaders. 
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The 1 arm of the law1 is urlikely to stretch throughout 
society and there are likely to be rather large differences 
between laws and other commands issued from the centre and 
the actual conduct of civil affairs. In other words, there 
will probably be rather severe limitations on governments3 
ability to achieve what they want. 
The next generalisation, or.e that scarcely needs 
elaboration, is that the planner's view of politicians as 
role-oriented and relatively disinterested is unlikely to be 
generally valid. If we view society as fragmented and its 
politics as an arena for competition between rival interests, 
it follows that many of its participants will seek to promote 
a particular rather than the general interest. Apart from 
promoting particular interests, they may not, moreover, see 
51 politics .as a means of achieving specific policy goals? 
Partly members have as their chief motivation ,the 
desire to obtain the intrinsic rewards of holding 
office; therefore they formúlate pílicies as means 
of holding office rather than seeking office in order 
to carry our preconceived policies. 
Some would go further, viewing politics as aggrandizement, 
in which the chief concerns of those in power are "first, i • • 
the enrichment of the government itself (i.e. of the ruler, 
of Ministers, of party Íeaders, of top civil servants, and 
possibly of numerous subordínate ranks of public officers and 
party workers), and secondly the buying of political support ^1 
which will enable the government to maintain itself in power'.'" " 
My point is not to advócate a cynical view but rather to point 
out the unwisaom of taking an exclusively high-minded view 
of politicians. They may be at least as often concerned to . 
evade issues as to confront them,. and will often prefer to 
react to problems rather than anticípate them. i; 
What is more, they may often be right in deferring 
action, in the real world of imperfect knowledge 
and large uncertainties. Thus, Rawls has proposed a 
'principie of postponement' which holds that, "other things 
being equal, rational plans try to keep our hands free until 
53 we have a clear view of the relevant facts." Certainly, 
- 15 -
one generalisation which can be offered with confidence is 
that knowledge will be very inccmpletef the more so the 
further ahead the decisión-maker is trying to look. The 
existing stock of knowledge, the current flow of information, 
the jcapacity to absorb and interpret information - all these 
leave much to be desired in developlng or, indeed, any other 
countries. Economists are well aware of this but have failed 
to recognise its uncomfortable implications for development 
planning. In a hit-or-miss worla where there is only the 
most approximate grasp of how an the economy will respond te 
a given policy action and when that action will almost 
certainly generate unexpected second-order effeets, it is by no 
means obvious that medium-term planning is helpful or 
54 
fitting. The standard answer would be that the remedy is 
to improve our knowledge rather than abandon planning, but are 
we entitled to as sume that the benefits from acquiring the 
necessary additional knowledge (even if that were feasible) 
would exceea the costs of doing so? The recent growth of in-
terest in the economics of information has not yet had much 
impact on the planning literature; and there is no treatment 
in it of the often acute time constraints within which 
government decision-makers normally operate and the large 
costs, therefore, of decisión procedures which fail to 
economise on time. What is clear is that the often acute 
state of uncertainty in which policy has to be formulated will 
tend to shorten time horizons in a manner inimical to medium-
term planning. 
Acceptance as the general case of a society which is frag-
mented, in which the roie-orientation of politicians cannot 
be taken for granted, and in which most policy decisions have 
to be made in the presence of large uncertainties, has a number 
of far-reaching implications for the way in which we ought 
reasonably to view governmental processes. The first is that 
the notion of a national interest (and a social welfare func-
tion) becomes fuszy to the point of uselessness. Pluralism 
implies the fragmentation of influence and decisión making over 
numerous agencies, each with its own way of perceiving problems, 
its own preferences and priorities. This inevitably gives 
rise to múltiple ánd confiicting objectives. In consequence, 
- 16 -
governments normally stick to a high and non-operational 
level of generality when stating their objectives and are 
most reluctant to specify with any precisión what priorities 
55 ' _ they attach to each of these. Indeed, one of their objectives 
56 
may be to conceal what their, true objectives are. Moreover, 
the interplay of interest groups, agencies and personalities 57 
will result in a constantly-shifting balance of preferences, 
giving the ideal of a long-term or ever¿ medium-term policy 
perspective a rather utopian quality - a tendency rnade all 
the stronger.because the working-out of past policies will pro-
vide an input into the further definition of .problems and goals. 
The existence cf múltiple objectives will also to undermine 
the rather sharp distinction that economists" generally make 
between goals and policy instrumente, for.what is regarded-
simply as .an instrument by some may be regarded by others .. 
as having at least some of the qualities of a goal (e.g. poli-
cies reiating to parastatal crgani3ations , incomes and the 58 
exchange rate). J This further obscures the concept of the 
social welfare function and complicates yet more the formula-
tion of policy. 
It is for reasons such as these that concepts like 
the national interest and the social welfare function quite 
fail to provide either an operationai or a philosphical basis 
for the normative economics of planning. In this respect 
political philosophers, who have generally abandoned the use 
of such abstractions, are in advance of welfare economists, 
still stuck with them. Quite apart from the problem of 
inter-personal comparisons, the problems of identifying 
interests, somehow converting these into a national 
interest, and then translating this into policy actions are 
insuperable. The answer is not to be found in the interests 
-5Q of the majority, fors 
We often.think it right, for example, to tax the majority 
to relieve a needy minority; and we shouid cor.demn 
majority action if it took no account of suffering 
inflicted on the few, merely because they were a few. 
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It is equally invalid to argüe that a party elected into 
office has a mandate to execute the programme on which 
fin it fought: 
The electors' will is limited to the single question 
decided at the poli: Who shall govern? Nothing can 
be inferred beyond that. To say that a party 
programme has been endorsed by the electorate - or 
even by a majority of the electors - is highly 
misleading, for no-one can say how many voted for 
the party despite any given item, or even despite 
the entire programme. The mandate theory is capable 
of a negative application at best; one can say of 
any given proposal of a victcrious party only 
that it was not so impopular that it cost the party the 
election. That is scarcely an electoral authority 
to proceed. 
How much more intransigent these problems become in the 
political systems of most developing countries, commonly 
lacking meaningful elections and institutional arrangements 
that "encourage consultation, negotiation, the exploration 
of alternatives, and the search for mutually beneficial 
61 solutions. 
All this means the end of optimisation, for that 
ideal presumes the existence of agreed criteria by which 
an act of policy may be assessed, and also at least a large 
probability that an act will have the consequences it 
is ant.icipated to have. Decision-making in the face of 
major social aivisions becomes a balancing act rather than 
a search for óptima; a process of conflict-resolution in 
which social tranquility is a basic concern rather than the 
maximisation of the rate of grewth or some such. Indeed, 
one of the further implications of the foregoing is that 
economic objectives, including 'development', are likely 
to come lower on the pecking order of government concerns 
than the case for development planning implicity assumes. 
The maintenance of government authority and social peace 
will tend to be the dominant themes, and acceptenace of a 
'development' objective is likely to be conditional on the 
extent to which it furthers these higher-pricrity, 'non-
economic® concerns. Yet another implication is that consis-
tency is not necessaily to be taken as a norm of the ratio-
nality of government policies, for the maintenance of authority 
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and the balancing of competing groups may well forcé 
governments to twist this way and that, simultaneously 
62 pursuing apparently contradrctory policies. 
To the dynamic tensions of conflict-resolution and the 
pervasive facts of ignorance and uncertainty, we might add the 
further consideration, familiar in other branches of economics, 
that man (and therefore man-managed institutions) quite lacks 
the intellectual equipment te pursue the kind of optimising 
rationality that is often assumed of him in economics (and 
6 3 of governments in development planning). The reality is 
6 4 what Simón has called the 'principie of bounded rationality': * 
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and 
solving complex problems is very small compared with 
the size of the problems whose solution is required 
for objectively rational behaviour in the real 
world- or even for a reasonable approximation to such 
objective rationality. 
Man (including politicians and public servants) responds 
by simplifying, by narrowing the range of alternatives 
considerea, by economising on information and its costs -
r c in a word, by abanaoning optimisation: 
There is evry evidence that in complex policy 
situations, so-called decisión makers do not strive 
to optimise some valué ñor is the notion of 
optimisation a useful way of ordering and analysing 
their behaviour regardless of their intentions. 
To borrow from the modern theory of the firm, we 
have to view governments as 1satisficers' - as pursuing 
solutions that are 1good enough', as being satisfied with 
any of a range of possible outeomes, as placing a premium 
on risk-avoidance and flexibility - a point well conveyed 
by the chiché that pclitics is the art of the possible. 
Satisficing offers this flexibility by being defined in terms 
of aspiration levels which are constantly adjusted in the 
light of past attainments and changing perceptions of future 
possibilities. It probably biasses decisions in favour of 
incremental rather than structurai change, for major trans-
formations create new uncertainties and confiicts which are 
66 often difficult to anticípate." 
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A11 in all, then, it seems that a realistic view of 
politics and decision-making ih developing countries conflicts 
at almost very point with the, largely implicit, model of 
politics adopted by proponents of development planning, 
summarised at the end of the previous section. Governments 
will not have clear and stable objectives, but the resolution 
and avoidance of social conflicts ana the maintenance of 
their own authority are likely te be among their main 
preoccupations, with a consequential demotion of the develop-
ment objective. The fragmentation of power and the large 
uncertainties surrounding many decisions make the notion 
of optimisation rather useless; the uncertainties and the 
fact of political instabiiity also make for shorter time 
horisons than would be compatible with medium-term planning. 
A view of policy formation as a process of continuous . 
adaptation also subverts the idea of planning for the 
medium-term. The role-orientation of politicians cannot 
be taken for granted; ñor are we entitled to assume that 
planning is, or could be, used to assert social valúes, 
or the national interest, over market imperfections. The 
intention here is not to assert a monolithic model of politics 
in low-income countries in direct opposition to the planner's 
model; merely to suggest that the pcints made in this section 
are aspeets of the seene of which we ought to take note. 
If we do so, the 'the prevalence of pseudo-planning' 
is no longer much of a mystery. It is suggested that . ... : 
economists' conceptions cf development planning are based 
on a view of politics so far removed from the realities as 
to vastly reduce the operational utility cf the concept. 
For the most part, governments do not and could not function 
in the manner implied in the literature, and so that type 
of activity which has come to be callea planning is inevitably 
rather unrelated to actual day-to-day decisión making. 
But besides questicning the practicability of develop-
ment planning as it was described early in this article, 
it is also worth asking whether, if planning were feasible, 
it would promise to be an efficient instrument of government 
policy. The analysis has emphasised decision-making as 
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a continuous and interactive process, in which decisions are 
phases of an.ongoing controversy rather than analytically 
discrete entities, Today's decisions will often iiapinge 
6 7 
upon our freeaon to act in the future, ' and the consequences 
of today's decisions., will likely throw up new problems which 
in their turn cali for a policy response. Similarly, we 
must expect a situation in which ends are adjustad to means, 
as a result of reappraisals in the iight of past experiences 6 8 
with-policies, just as means are tailored to ends?- and 
we require a decisión system flexible enough to accommodate 
many uncertainties and a situation in which, for lack of 
Information, it is often ratior.al to postpone decisions until 63 uncertainties are reduced. Although it is a paradoxical 
criticism of something that has been described as ir.jecting 
7 0 
the time factor into policy analysis,'w it seems that medium-
term development planning, as it has come to be understood, 
is not well equiped to efficiently accommodate the aynamics 
of depision-making. i \ . • 
Instead we rnight borrow from the ideas of cybernetics 
and think in terms of a system which is continuously adjusted 
in the light of feedback information on tne consequences of 
past actions, where by feedback we mean "a communications 
network that produces action in response to an input of 
information, and induces the results of its own actions 
in the new information by which it modifies its subsequent 
72 
behaviour. ' " Indeed, it has been suggested, in a differem: 
context, that .a mocern 'cybernetics approacn' to planning 
would not be very different, in its sensitivity to feedback, 73 
from muddling through. 
Conclusions 
Aside from the last two paragraphs, the argument 
ceveloped here has been directed to the practicability of 
planning and has left much of the thecretical case for it 
substantially unscathed. There remains an obvious need for 
taking an ovarall view of economic policyr for studying the 
inter-actions between policy instruments and, where' it is 
politicaily feasible, for co-ordinating them. There is still 
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a need to try to anticípate problems and thus de-fuse them; 
and to understand the future implications cf preeent actions, 
within the limits of our knowledge. Above all, there remains 
a need for a vehicle, albeit a Tro jan iiorse, that will permit 
'the economic point of view' to be represented in the councils 
of government, and planning may be such a vehicle. The issue, 
then, is not whether planning is aesirable but what can be 
rescued from medium-term development plann ing that is a Iso 
feasible. 
What the argument suggests is that it would be more 
fruitful to think of planning as a continuous input into 
official decision-making processes, rather than as a 
discontinuous, once-every-five-years, output of the system. 
One of its chief functions would be to reduce the uncertain-
ties surrounding major economic problems and thus widen the 
scope for improvea, more 'rational', decisions, when there 
are reasonable grounds for thinking that the benefits of 
this action would exceed the costs. Anotner would be to 
focus on advising the government on the best first move in 
74" 
any situation, on improving the flow of feedback information, 
on monitoring prcgress, and on advising what adjustments 
the feedback indicates to be desirafcle. 
There is no question, on the other hand, but that this 
type of change would provoke strong intellectual resistances. 
Economists will surely resist the conclusión presented here 
that optimisation has little practica! meaning and, therefore, 
that scphisticated optimising techniques, whiie they may 
be valuable for purposes of academic analysis, are largely 
useless as aevices for influencing the future. Yet, the 
attention bxas induced by economists' preoccupation with 
the use of macro-models and input-output analysis - and with 
the elegance and internal consistency which they offer -
has surely harmed the cause of planning by contributing to 
the neglect of political realities and the mundane specifics of 
everyday policy formation. Of course, these techniques will 
retain a place in the equipment of the economic adviser, 
but it is a place that deserves to be more modest than it 
has been in the past. 
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A further implication of the argument has been to throw 
a large dcubt over the practical usefulness of the notion 
of a long-term development strategy. In principie this 
remains a most -attractive idea, from which real benefits 
could be achieved, but in the fluxing keleidoscope of social 
tensions, conflicting interests and - probably - changing 
governments (to say nothing of the unpredictability of the 
outside world), can it be given any practical meaning? Only, 
it would seem, if there is a broad consensus about the 
desired long-term nature of society, but reasons have been 
given for believing that such a consensus rarely exists. 
Perhaps the most tnat can be hopea for is that it will be 
possible to devise strategies for particular aspects of 
. socio-economic policy whcse nature virtually demands 
a long-term perspectiva¡ as in the case of population, manpower 
and educational planning. 
Planning, then, is seen partly as a way of insinuating 
(or maintaining) a corps of economic advisers into day-to-day 
governmental decisión-making, and this corps as one of a 
number of groups competing for influence within the system. 
76 
But, as Leys point out, economists in government often 
fail as a group because they lack discrimination - ,¡pursuing 
very ambitious goals in all sectors at all times" - because 
they are often poorly located within the system, and because 
of an attention bias which predisposes them to neglect 
political realism in the searcn for technically óptima! solu-
tions. 
Greater effectiveness would probably result if economic 
advisers attended more te the resources which they as a 
group could deploy within the decision-making system and 
to iaentifying the key leverage points in the system upon 
which they should concéntrate. Their resources might include 
possession of expertise and information valued by governments 
and their civil services¡ their ability to produce certain 
kinds of outputs (briefings on the state of the economy, 
submissions to the World Bank and I.M.F.) beyond the competence 
of the administrativo civil service; a superior ability to 
marshall persuasivo argumenta on cuestiona of economic policy; 
and power to provide, or withold, legitimisation for certain 
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types of expenditure (e.g. as a result of project appraisals). 
In plain vords, economists have tp earn their influence by 
proving their practical valué to governments - in a way 
that they often fail to do through preoccupation with the 
preparation of plans. 
The profession, it is true, has given 
thought to the question of leverage points, and there has 
been extensive aiscussion on the best status and location 
77 
of planning agencies. But this conceptual framework is 
not well suited to a recognition that there are likely to 
be a number of important leverage points where it would be 
valuable to have economic expertise, and that there are likely 
to be many circumstances in which to concéntrate such 
expertise in a planning agency would not be the. most effective 
deployment. One of the costs of development planning has 
been precisely that it has tied economists to a relatively 
unproductive agency when they could have been far better 
employed in budget bureaus, commerce ministries, finance 
corporations and so on. In fact, the finance ministry offers 
itself as a natural leverage point for economists. Budgets 
are of critical importance politically and for economic policy, 
both macro and micro, and many cf the resources of government 
are devoted to its implementation. It is thoroughly built 
into the decisión process and provides obvious oppcrtunities 
for economists to depicy the resources at their command. 
Should planners still produce plans? The trend of the 
argument runs ^.gainst preparing plan documents, but probably 
the most general answer is that it all depends on how badly 
governments feel that they need a plan. If governments want 
a plan badly enough then ability to produce it becomes one 
of the economistcs resources in seeking to influence policies. 
In such situations the general principies should be to keep 
the plans as flexible as possible (which favours annual 
7 8 
plans ), and to avoid devoting such a concentration of 
expertise to their preparation that other leverage points 
become seriously neglected. 
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Lastly, it is tempting te see a inore general lesson 
for economists in the analysis of this paper. The planner's 
model of politics presented earlier had three major character-
istiess (1) it was largely unarticulated, being derived mostly" 
by inferences from the literature; (2) "it was nevertheless 
rather obviously a normativa rather than a descriptive view;'* 
and (3) it incorporated a very high degree of abstracticn 
from observed behaviour. The reason for these, it is 
suggested, was the convenience of the profession. Our model 
of politics was left inexpiieit because if we had to articúlate 
it and ar-ill be taken seriously as policy advisers we would 
surely have had to nartow the gap between the model and obser-
ved behaviour. But reducing the l^vel of abstration in that 
way would bring us face to face with the substantial irrele-
vance of much of the planning literature and many of the 
techniques with which it is replete. As Loasby put it in 
80 relation te theories of the firm, behavioural theory" 
has no use for traditional basic concepts: 
optimisation has no usable meaning; economists3 
heavy investment in calculus becoir.es redundant; 
equilibriuxr. is not. definen; and there are no 
general analytical solutions. 
Thus, one might see the case of development planning 
as an illustration of a paradigm crisis that confronts 
economics en a much wider front, in which the returns from 
our "investment in calculus' are dependent on a level of 
abstraction from the real worid? and a disciplinary speciali-
sation, which threatens to undermine the social usefulness 
of our profession and our claims to serious attention as 
policy advisers. I would urge that it is fundamentally 
irresponsible to offer policy advice while abstracting in 
such high degree from political realities* that we would 
benefit from being more explicit when making assumptions 
about political processes,- that we should narrow the gao 
between our prescriptive view of politics and the real world; 
and that in doing so we should consider the possibility that 
other social sciences might have useful things to say. 
Kopefully, this article has given some suppcrt to the latter 
proposition. 
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71. Thus, in an analysis of rural development projects in 
Kenya, Holmquist, 1970 p. 228, point out that "There 
is a popular conception of planning which sees the 
acceptance of a plan as the "big3 decisión which in turn 
determines the policy outcome. But this... ignores 
the fact that fundamental policy decisions are made 
during, as well as prior to, implementation." 
72. Deutsch, 1966 p. 88 (italics omitted). . 
73. R. Bauer, 1966 pp. 7-8 
74. I have borrowed this idea from Cohén and Cyert, 1965 
p. 313 
75. Seers, 1972 p. 32, however, disagrees, arguing that 
the term planning should be used "for drawing up a 
central strategy with priorities for the lonqer term, 
and seeing that it is carried into effect.., 
76. Leys, 1972 pp. 61-2. 
77. .For example, see Waterston, 19G6 chapter XIII. 
• ' I ' • : • ' : . . . 
78. . Economists have generally argued against reliance on 
annual plans and.it is interesting that its main advocates 
incluáe.an economic administrator (Waterston, 1972 passim) 
and a. political scientist (Leys, 1972 p. 66 ff.). 
79. Thus, Tinbergen, 1955 pp. 74-6, takes a strongly moralis-
tic view of ''Personal hobbies or aversions; animosities 
between various offices,- directorates, ministries or 
countries5, as among the influences that "intervene 
wrongly" in the forma-cion of policy. Recall also his . 
assertion that government objectives ''must always have been 
. . •. considerad as some versión of 'the general interest.'" 
Griffin and Enes, 1970 p. 185, provide a more recent 
example of the normative natura of economists" writings 
on politics, prefacing their discussion of plan implementa-
tion and organisation with the statements that "Govern-
ment must assume a positivo role in development. It 
cannot be content rnerely te 'hold the ring' while others 
fight-.oif Government is to contribute to progress 
rather than retard it it must be properly organised." 
80. Loasby, 1971 p. 882. 
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